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Abstract
Surrogate motherhood is an assisted procreation practice by which a woman gestates an embryo with which
she has no biological relationship on behalf of a contracting couple or individual, having to relinquish the child to
them after its birth. This practice normally entails a financial remuneration for the pregnant woman; when this is
not the case, it is called altruistic surrogacy. From a medical perspective, potential problems for the surrogate
and for children born through this practice should be taken into account, especially the existence of possible
disabilities in the child. The bioethical aspects are of most interest because the practice of surrogacy objectifies
the expectant mother, by using her body for a purpose other than her own good, treating her as a commodity,
as a thing. The same is true for the child because it makes him a disposable object, something that can be
instrumentalized, similarly objectifying him.
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Surrogacy is the procreative practice in which a
woman gestates an embryo with which she has no
biological relationship for another person, eventually
relinquishing the child to the other party. This prac-
tice normally involves financial remuneration for the
surrogate; when this does not occur, it is called
altruistic surrogacy. A gestational carrier was first
used in 1985 (Utian et al. 1985).
Between 1999 and 2013, there were 30,927 surro-
gate pregnancies in the United States, 8,581 of which
were singleton pregnancies, 4,566 were twin preg-
nancies, and 233 were triplet pregnancies, resulting
in 13,380 deliveries, with a total of 18,400 infants
born (Perkins et al. 2016). It is estimated that, in
India, more than 25,000 children have been born
through gestational surrogacy (Shetty 2012). In
Georgia in the Caucasus region of Eurasia, an unof-
ficial estimate by the Public Defender’s Office states
that around 3,000 children have been born through
surrogacy since 1997; although as clinics are not
obliged to provide data, these figures may not be
very accurate. The only reliable data that can be
obtained come from notarized records of newborns:
150 of these acts were recorded in 2012 and 170 in
2013, according to figures provided by the Georgia
Ministry of Health (Ellena 2014).
Although this practice has not been legalized in
Spain—and so there are no reliable data—it is esti-
mated that figures for children born abroad through
surrogacy could exceed 1,500 (del Burgo 2015).
Didac Sánchez, director of Subrogalia, a company
that promotes surrogacy, says that they saw 180
cases in 2016, with 580 already predicted for the next
year; in two years, they hope to reach 650 (Peraita
2016).
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In the United Kingdom, where only altruistic sur-
rogacy is allowed, it is believed that 0.2 percent of
children born in assisted reproduction clinics were
through a surrogacy arrangement (Norton et al.
2015).
The Catholic Church opposes surrogacy, whether
or not for profit, on the basis of human dignity. How-
ever, the practice of surrogacy in various forms, and
under various regulations, has so illustrated the
ethical problems with this practice that even some
secular organizations agree that surrogacy is funda-
mentally incompatible with human dignity and
should not be permitted. This article provides an
overview of the status of surrogacy in various coun-
tries, including discussion of some of the important
legal cases that arose from the practice, followed
by a detailed analysis of the ethical issues involved
in surrogacy from both the Catholic standpoint and
the secular perspectives that are in harmony with
Catholic teaching.
Background
Surrogacy is most often used when there is an
absence of the uterus in a woman who wishes to
become a mother. The absence can be congenital
or due to uterine diseases that require its removal,
and there may also be structural or functional altera-
tions that render the woman unable to carry a preg-
nancy. It is also increasingly used in situations
where two men desire to raise a biologically related
child.
A large study (Dar et al. 2014), that included 178
surrogate pregnancies, after 333 stimulation cycles,
142 of these ended in a live birth and 36 in a miscar-
riage (Jadva et al. 2012). More recently, a systematic
review was published (Söderström-Anttila et al.
2016) that assessed 1,795 articles related with surro-
gacy, of which they used 55 that met the inclusion
criteria; the pregnancy rate per embryo transfer was
between 19 percent and 33 percent (Söderström-
Anttila et al. 2016), about the same as In Vitro Fer-
tilisation (IVF) in general, but underscoring that, in
order to achieve a successful pregnancy, a number
of embryos may be lost, one of the reasons the
Church finds the process inconsistent with human
dignity (Aznar and Minguez 2012).
Legal Regulation of Surrogacy
There is no legal consensus regarding the desirability
of surrogacy, whether for payment or altruistic.
Understanding the approaches of various countries
is helpful in understanding and anticipating the legal
complications that can arise from surrogacy, whether
regulated or not.
At present, commercial surrogacy (i.e., surrogacy
for payment) is legal with no restrictions in the
nation of Georgia, Israel, Ukraine, Russia, and, in the
United States, in California. In Europe, it is
expressly prohibited in Austria, Bulgaria, Denmark,
Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Malta, Norway,
Spain, and Sweden.
Altruistic—but not commercial—surrogacy is
permitted under various conditions in Belgium,
Greece, Holland, United Kingdom, Portugal, Austra-
lia, Canada, New Zealand, and some North Ameri-
can states (Söderström-Anttila et al. 2016), while
in Europe, it is not legally regulated in Poland and
the Czech Republic (Deomampo 2015).
In Spain, as mentioned, surrogacy is prohibited
by law. In fact, Article 10 of the Law on Assisted
Human Reproduction (2006) states that: “1. Any
contract under which gestation is agreed, either with
or without remuneration, by a woman who
renounces her maternal rights in favour of the con-
tracting party or another third party shall be null and
void. 2. The parenthood of children born as a result
of a surrogate pregnancy will be determined by
birth.” In 2016, the Assembly of Madrid put forward
a motion, promoted by the political party Ciudada-
nos, to regulate surrogacy, but the bill was narrowly
defeated by sixty-two votes in favor to sixty-four
against.
In Europe, in 2011, the European Parliament
adopted a resolution against the legalization of surro-
gacy because it “constitutes an exploitation of the
female body and her reproductive organs,” based
on the Convention on the Rights of the Child, which
in Article 7.1 stipulates that every child “has the
right to know and be cared for by his or her parents.”
More recently, on November 30, 2015, the plenary
session of the European Parliament, in their “Annual
Report on Human Rights and Democracy in the
World,” declared that it “condemns the practice of
surrogacy, which undermines the human dignity of
the woman since her body and reproductive func-
tions are used as a commodity, considers that the
practice of gestational surrogacy which involves
reproductive exploitation and use of the human body
for financial or other gain, in particular in the case of
vulnerable women in developing countries, shall be
prohibited and treated as a matter of urgency in
human rights instruments.”
Furthermore, on November 23, 2016, the Com-
mittee on Social Affairs, Health and Sustainable
Development of the Parliamentary Assembly of the
Council of Europe met in Paris to discuss “Human
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Rights and Ethical Issues related to Surrogacy,” for
the possible approval of this practice, at the proposal
of Belgian socialist senator Petra De Sutter, a gyne-
cologist by profession. The proposal was denied
because it “considers that it valued women and chil-
dren as commodities that can be exploited.”
Surrogacy has been permitted in Greece for
Greek residents and European Union citizens since
July 2014, if they are heterosexual couples or single
women who are residing temporarily in Greece, pro-
vided that the surrogacy is altruistic. The gestational
carrier can receive financial compensation for any
inconvenience as a result of the pregnancy, the
reward may not exceed €10,000. Surrogacy is also
permitted in the United Kingdom, although like
Greece, only if it is altruistic.
In Portugal, a law was approved on May 13,
2016, legalizing surrogacy, although restricting the
practice to women with no womb or who for some
medical reason have no possibility of pregnancy; it
must also be altruistic. Recently, the Finnish Minis-
try of Health and the Swedish Medical Ethics Com-
mittee have suggested that altruistic surrogacy
should be permitted in restricted medical situations.
In March 2004, Canada enacted the “Canadian
law on assisted procreation,” which banned remuner-
ated surrogacy, as well as advertising or intermedia-
tion for profit, and states that women must be over
twenty-one years old (Reina and Porras Ferreyra
2017). In the event of failure to comply with this law,
guilty parties could receive a maximum penalty of
ten years in prison and a fine of up to 100,000 Cana-
dian dollars.
In Thailand, surrogacy is legal, but in August
2015, a law came into effect restricting it, nonaltruis-
tic surrogacy; it is now only permitted if the gesta-
tional carrier is the sister of one of the contracting
parents (Aceprensa 2015).
Commercial surrogacy was legalized in India in
2002, but the Indian government announced its
intention in 2016 to ban commercial surrogacy (Ace-
prensa 2016; Ramskold and Posner 2013; Perappa-
dan 2014), which had given rise to a lucrative
procreative industry estimated to exceed US$2.3 bil-
lion annually. Since then, it has only been available
to Indian couples legally married for at least five
years who can medically justify their infertility; for-
eign couples, homosexual couples and single people,
or people who already have a biological or adopted
child are not eligible.
In October 2016, Supreme Court of Justice in
Nepal decided to suspend all surrogacy programs
in the country (http://www.surrogacy.ru/es/news/
news26.php n.d.), which could have a major social
repercussion because Nepal has become the pre-
ferred destination of Western couple for this practice
after surrogacy was made illegal in India and
Thailand.
In Nigeria, surrogacy has taken on dramatic over-
tones with the proliferation of what has come to be
called “baby factories,” which are unused buildings
where pregnant surrogate women and teenagers can
stay until they give birth to their children (Makinde
et al. 2016). These baby factories are illegal institu-
tions, very often linked to human exploitation net-
works around the world. Twenty baby factories
were identified in Nigeria between 2008 and 2014,
in which more than 290 pregnant women or women
who had recently given birth were shut away.
In Mexico, there was a legal vacuum that to some
extent allowed the use of surrogacy, encouraged by
the low cost of the process, especially in the state
of Tabasco. However, at the end of 2015, the
Tabasco Civil Code was reformed, so that from
2016, only Mexican residents can contract a surro-
gate, although even then, they must meet certain
medical requirements (Reina 2016).
A particular difficult problem to resolve is know-
ing the legal status of a child who has been born out-
side. In such circumstances, the child may not be
registered in the Civil Registry because accepting the
registration of said children could be assumed as
recognizing the legal right to a practice prohibited
by law.
Filiation of the infant, that is, registration in the
Civil Registry of the pertinent country, is authorized
in Albania, Spain, Estonia, Hungary, Ireland, Czech
Republic, United Kingdom, Russia, Slovenia, and
Ukraine and expressly prohibited in Andorra, Ger-
many, Bosnia Herzegovina, Latvia, Lithuania, Mol-
davia, Monaco, Montenegro, Romania, Serbia, and
Turkey.
In Spain, children born abroad to surrogate can be
registered in the Spanish consulate in the country
where they were born, in accordance with Article 8
of the “European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms” and then
registered in Spain under the protection of instruc-
tion no. 5 of the Directorate General of Registries
and Notaries, 2010. Furthermore, a recent Supreme
Court decision reaffirmed the possibility of registra-
tion of these minors in the Registry and grants the
contracting parents the rights derived from that
parentage.
In addition, on December 12, 2014, the Council
of Ministers approved that children born to surro-
gates could be registered in the Spanish Civil Regis-
try, which opens the door for couples or single
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persons who have used a surrogate abroad (in a coun-
try where it is legal) to register the children in the
Civil Registry and thus legalize their parentage. This
is in accordance with the ruling in the European
Court of Human Rights in 2014, which recognizes
the right of the minor to be registered in the Civil
Registry by the contracting parents.
Subsequently, and at the demand of a Spanish
male same-sex couple who had a child through sur-
rogacy in California, the same Supreme Court court-
room ruled that preventing children born abroad
from resolving their parentage violates their rights.
To solve the problem, it was suggested that the child
could be listed as the biological child of the member
of the couple who had donated the semen and adop-
tive child of the other. Thus, the child could have
Spanish nationality and not remain legally defense-
less, although it could not be registered as a child
of both of the contracting fathers.
In Italy, a peculiar case occurred when the Eur-
opean Court of Human Rights, on January 31,
2017, backed the decision of the Italian authorities
to withdraw custody from the parents of a child born
in Russia through a surrogate with whom they had no
biological link. This decision of the European High
Court was based on the fact that the rights of the
child must be put before any other. However, that
same court demanded in 2014 that a group of chil-
dren born to surrogates in the United States should
be registered in the Civil Registry because although
surrogacy is not legal in France, “the interests of the
minors should prevail, since they cannot be denied
their right to a private life or to adopt the nationality
of their biological parent.”
In our opinion, and by way of summary, there are
two aspects of surrogacy that should be analyzed
separately. The first refers to that pertaining to surro-
gacy (surrogates) and the second to that which
affects the child.
In relation to that which affects the child, it is
unquestionable that any legal decision should seek
the child’s own good, regardless of the medium used
in conception. In this respect, we are in no doubt that
allowing any child born through a surrogate to be
registered in the Civil Registry of the corresponding
country is a good for such a child, since it will allow
him to join a family and consequently enjoy all the
benefits that this implies. In relation to the surrogate,
it should be made clear at the same time that, inde-
pendent of the approach taken with the child, surro-
gacy is or should be an illegal practice that entails
undeniable ethical and moral difficulties.
Financial Aspects of Surrogacy
The economic treatment of commercial surrogacy
varies depending on whether it relates to countries
in which this practice is legal or those in which it
is not. We will therefore refer only to some of the
countries in which it is legal because there is no con-
trol of economic treatment in the others. Neither will
we discuss countries in which surrogacy was for-
merly legal, such as India, Nepal, and Thailand.
In California, the price of the surrogacy process
ranges between $70,000 and $120,000, with the sur-
rogate usually receiving around $2,700 per month,
after confirming that the embryo transfer has been
successful and the pregnancy has commenced. To
this figure are added medical costs, as well as insur-
ance, clothing, transport, and others that the pregnant
mother may need during the nine months of preg-
nancy (Conquero 2015).
In the South Caucasus republic of Georgia, the
price of surrogacy ranges between $25,000 and
$50,000, according to figures provided by the differ-
ent websites of various specialized clinics. Of this
amount, around $15,000 goes to the surrogate
(Ellena 2014).
In Ukraine, the average price of surrogacy is
$37,000, the most economic of the countries in
which this practice is legal. An additional advantage
is that this country offers very reasonable prices for
the contracting parents who wish to be present in the
last weeks of the pregnancy and birth, as the cost of
an apartment for two months is around $1,000 (Sur-
rogacy Ukraine.com n.d.).
Potential Medical Problems in the
Surrogate Derived from the Pregnancy
The same medical problems are possible in gesta-
tional carriers as in any other normal pregnancy,
such as miscarriages, ectopic pregnancy, various
obstetric complications, and multiple pregnancies.
In this respect, in the aforementioned review (Söder-
ström-Anttila et al. 2016), no medical problems were
detected in the surrogates different to those present
in women who had become pregnant naturally or
using assisted reproduction techniques, although a
previous study (Szejer 2009, 608) showed that
long-term, surrogate mothers may suffer
“depression, anxiety, various physical symptoms of
psychological distress, feelings of insecurity or suici-
dal tendencies.”
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Effect of Medical Problems in Children
Born through Surrogacy
The first thing that must be evaluated is whether chil-
dren born through surrogacy might have more or dif-
ferent medical problems than children born naturally
or through other assisted procreation techniques,
when this technique is used in surrogacy. The litera-
ture indicates that children born by IVF have more
adverse secondary problems than those born natu-
rally (Cheng and Heilbronn 2017). By contrast, in
the aforementioned paper (Söderström-Anttila et al.
2016), it was found that, ten years after the birth,
no psychological differences were detected between
children born through surrogacy and those born
through assisted reproduction techniques or naturally
(Golombok et al. 1996; Jadva and Imrie 2014; Shen-
field et al. 2005; Bos and van Balen 2010; MacCal-
lum et al. 2003).
Disability may occasionally be detected in chil-
dren conceived by surrogacy during the pregnancy
or after birth. In light of this, three positions with
respect to the surrogacy arrangement are possible:
(a) that the disability be assumed by the con-
tracting parents and they accept the child
born;
(b) that contracting parents do not accept it, and
the responsibility is transferred to the surro-
gate mother, attempting to resolve it by
encouraging her to abort the child. If she
aborts, the problem is solved. However, it
is sometimes difficult to determine to whom
this decision to abort belongs: the contract-
ing parents or the surrogate? On most occa-
sions, however, it is the contracting parents
who decide, so they can impose an abortion
on the pregnant surrogate that she may or
may not desire. In any case, the decision to
abort, although it may be contractually sup-
ported, does not exempt one from the moral
responsibility that abortion entails; and
(c) that the surrogate is obliged to take care of a
child born with the aforementioned disabil-
ity and the contracting parents are relieved
of the responsibility.
A paradigmatic example of the above is the case
of Baby Gammy who sparked particular interest in
the international press. In this case, an Australian
couple contracted a Thai woman who had a twin
pregnancy; one of the children had Down syndrome,
while the other was normal. The contracting parents
took the normal child to Australia and left the child
with Down syndrome with the surrogate mother
(Robson 2014).
In any case, an attempt is generally made to
“resolve” this problem in the surrogacy contract,
leaving it well established which of the aforemen-
tioned proposed solutions is the one to be chosen.
Furthermore, there are even agencies that guarantee
a healthy child in writing. Thus, “Baby Bloom,” an
international agency with an office in London
(Babybloom.org.uk n.d.) offers a “complete surro-
gacy package” to achieve a healthy baby. This
agency works mainly in the United States, largely
in California, where this practice is legal.
One important aspect to achieving their goal is to
select the surrogate to be contracted using very rigor-
ous health criteria. Furthermore, the company guar-
antees not only the quality of the future gestational
surrogate but also the quality of the embryos to be
transferred, so “if the transferrable embryo, after a
genetic screening, shows some defect, it is not trans-
ferred, and if the imperfection manifests later in the
pregnancy, interruption of the pregnancy is guaran-
teed by abortion.”
This issue—determining to whom the decision to
abort legally corresponds—was evaluated at length
in an article published in Bioethics (Walker and van
Zyl 2015) because of a case that occurred in Connec-
ticut (United States) involving surrogate Crystal Kel-
ley. Following a medical examination at five months
pregnant, a series of potentially life-threatening
physical abnormalities were detected in the child,
including cleft lip, brain cysts, and heart defects, all
of which could seriously compromise the child’s
health. The contracting parents requested an abor-
tion, but Kelley, the surrogate mother, refused,
sparking an extensive legal debate on who should
abort or not.
One position is that of those who argue that the
surrogate has no right to make decisions regarding
the life of the child, since she is neither the child’s
genetic nor social mother; neither, however, are
there sufficient reasons to confer the entire rights
to the contracting parents, even if this is specified
in the surrogacy contract. The authors of this article
therefore advocate what they call the “professional
model,” in which the rights and responsibilities of
both parties must be assessed, although in essence,
they advocate that the right of the surrogate prevails
and that if she does not have an abortion, the con-
tracting parents have the obligation to take care of
the child.
This opinion appears to be shared by the Ameri-
can College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists
(ACOG), which stated that “to allow a woman to
Aznar and Peris 5
contract away the right to control her own health
would be to institute contractual slavery” (ACOG
Committee Opinion 1992).
Another situation, and one for which a concrete
solution has not been specified, is what to do with the
child if the contracting couple divorce. This occurred
with Baby Manji, born in India in 2008 as the result
of a commercial surrogacy agreement between a
Japanese couple and an Indian woman. After the sur-
rogacy agreement had been processed, the couple
divorced and neither of the two wanted the child,
although she was eventually taken in by the man’s
mother (Parks 2010). In a case where the filiation
of the child is to one parent only, as was the case with
the two men cited above, the issue can become even
more complicated.
When dealing with altruistic surrogacy, it is gen-
erally the surrogate who is allowed to decide what to
do with the disabled child, while the contracting par-
ents have the possibility of not accepting the child. In
our opinion, however, while these terms may be
administratively correct, they in no way resolve the
moral judgment that these facts merit because the
intending parents almost always choose not to accept
the disabled child, which presents ethical questions
of its own.
Another circumstance that may arise is that the
pregnancy is a twin or triple pregnancy, and all the
children are not accepted by the contracting parents.
This could be resolved by forcing the surrogate to
have a fetal reduction, a practice clearly immoral
from the standpoint of Catholic teaching and pre-
senting similar legal issues to those discussed above
in the case of the disabled child. If the surrogate
refuses, she has no option but to take care of the chil-
dren, as the contracting parents evade responsibility.
This happened in the case of California surrogate
Brittneyrose Torres who became pregnant with tri-
plets. The contracting parents asked her to undergo
embryo reduction, even though they had agreed in
advance to pay her $25,000 dollars for the pregnancy
and $5,000 dollars extra if it was a twin pregnancy;
however, a triplet pregnancy did not enter into their
plans. They therefore asked her to terminate one of
the fetuses, but she refused and decided to continue
with the pregnancy (Observatorio de Bioética UCV
n.d.).
Opinions and Actions for and Against
Surrogacy
Magisterium of the Catholic Church. The Magisterium
of the Catholic Church clearly and firmly prohibits
surrogacy, stating that the child “must be the fruit
and the sign of the mutual self-giving of the spouses,
of their love and of their fidelity” (Donum Vitae n.d.,
chapter 5, point 21). This does not happen in either
commercial or altruistic surrogacy because “it
offends the dignity and the right of the child to be
conceived, carried in the womb, brought into the
world, and brought up by his own parents; it sets
up, to the detriment of families, a division between
the physical, psychological, and moral elements
which constitute those families.” In summary,
assisted procreation is contrary to the unity of mar-
riage and to the dignity of the human person (Donum
Vitae n.d.; Donum Vitae n.d.; Varios autores 1992).
Commission of the Bishops’ Conferences of
the European Union (COMECE)—
Working Group in Ethics in Research and
Medicine
The COMECE, published on February 23, 2015, a
comprehensive document that (www.comece.eu
2015) evaluated gestational surrogacy, showing
clearly the ethical difficulties that present, resulting
mainly from the absolute control exerted over the
surrogate, both physical and mental, by specifying
the conditions required to be a suitable candidate
(which is a form of objectification of the surrogate),
invasion of privacy, and rupture of the emotional
bond between mother and child. Moreover, gesta-
tional surrogacy also implies objectification of the
child, by treating it as a product that must meet cer-
tain quality standards and is therefore unacceptable
under the Catholic view of the dignity of the human
person.
Spanish Episcopal Conference. In Spain, the president
of the Spanish Episcopal Conference, Cardinal
Ricardo Blázquez, rejected surrogacy in the inaugu-
ral speech at the CIX Plenary Assembly of Spanish
Bishops, stating that this practice does not respect
the dignity of the so-called surrogate mothers or
wombs for rent, or that of the child, because he or she
is obtained “outside the realm of dignity to be
conceived.”
But Why Can Surrogacy Be Described as
Morally Illicit?
From a Catholic point of view, surrogacy separates
the unitive and procreative aspects of marital act that
is morally illicit (Fernández Benito 2018). In order to
try to clarify this, we shall refer to point A-3 of
Donum Vitae (n.d.), in which it states that
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“Surrogate motherhood represents an objective fail-
ure to meet the obligations of maternal love, of con-
jugal fidelity and of responsible motherhood; it
offends the dignity and the right of the child to be
conceived, carried in the womb, brought into the
world and brought up by his own parents.”
To examine this in more depth, we need to extend
the framework that determines the immorality of sur-
rogacy which, as we know, focuses primarily on the
rupture of the inseparable unity of the conjugal act,
fertilization of the ovum and consequent generation
of the embryo, that is, on the rupture of a biological
act that has an unquestionable moral repercussion.
However, when assessing the moral licitness or
illicitness of surrogacy, we are of the opinion that
we cannot refer to a unitary act, but to a biological
process, consisting of the conjugal act, fertilization
of an ovum, generation of an embryo, and subse-
quent implantation of the embryo in the mother’s
womb. Consequently, any interruption, rupture, or
modification of that procreative process that affects
its bioontological unity could make it morally illicit.
And this is where, in our opinion, we must consider
the role of surrogacy because if one constituent of
the aforementioned reproductive process (in this
case surrogacy) is morally illicit, it makes the entire
process illicit (Aznar et al. 2017).
Other groups. On October 7, 2016, the Spanish Asso-
ciation of Bioethics published a statement in which it
expressed their opinion on surrogacy. It states that:
(a) surrogacy is, unequivocally, a new form of
exploitation of women, contrary to their dig-
nity, as it uses the female body, and therefore
her person, as a negotiable object;
(b) with respect to surrogate mothers, there is a
series of negative consequences for them
that is ethically difficult to accept, such as
the rupture of the bond created with the child
during the pregnancy and the obligation to
surrender the child at birth, which means that
the mother is pressured psychologically to
accept from the start that the child is not hers
and that she cannot establish any contact
with him;
(c) surrogacy is very lucrative business, based
on the commodification of women’s bodies,
which has created an emerging phenomenon
known as “reproductive tourism”;
(d) the gestational surrogacy contract (legal
vehicle for surrogacy) is null and void in the
Spanish legal system. Surrogacy contracts
are not prohibited in the strict sense; quite
simply, they has no effect. Legally, it is
understood that the person who gives birth
is the mother;
(e) there is no “right to procreation” and thus a
“right to a child” that justifies a supposed
right to surrogacy. Desires, however laud-
able, must be distinguished from true rights,
based on legitimate titles, and from the per-
spective of the common good;
(f) Spanish law provides a legal response to the
situation of children born as a result of ful-
fillment of an invalid contract because the
biological father can always determine
the filiation of the child in his favor, leaving
the possibility for his partner to adopt it; and
(g) to evaluate the best interests of the minor, the
perspective of judge and legislator should be
distinguished. The former judges, in retro-
spect, a situation, its unlawfulness, in which
one must seek the greater good of the minor;
in contrast, the legislator is called to regulate
future situations, so he must safeguard the
dignity and human rights of the subjects
involved: the mothers, who are exploited
through a rental contract, and the children,
who become the object of a purchase
agreement.
On May 11, 2015, a group of French personalities
from the cultural left published a manifesto in
French newspaper Libération (2015), stating that the
so-called gestational surrogacy should be banned
because it constitutes a violation of the human rights
of women and children; the rights of women are vio-
lated “because it often relies on the exploitation of
the most disadvantaged women” to the benefit of
rich couples. Moreover, “the medical process of sur-
rogacy entails risks for surrogates, for the young
women who sell their eggs and for children born
using assisted reproduction techniques.” It also
“breaks the natural maternal bond established during
the pregnancy.” The authors also state that “they see
no difference between the commercial practice of
surrogacy and the buying and selling of children,”
concluding that, “no-one has the right to a child, het-
erosexuals no more than homosexuals, or individuals
who have decided to remain single.” Therefore, they
“ask governments and international leaders to work
together to put an immediate end to this practice.”
Prominent European leftist political groups have
also protested against surrogacy, as they explained in
an open letter to then president of the French Repub-
lic, François Hollande (Delors et al. 2014), in which
they demanded that surrogacy should remain illegal
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because “the surrogacy contract is contrary to the
principle of respect for the person, both the woman
who carries the child and the child itself who is com-
missioned by one or two persons and develops in the
womb of the surrogate, because human beings are
not things.” Listed among the signatories are well-
known personalities such as Jacques Delors and Lio-
nel Jospin.
Similarly, a large group of Italian feminists,
together with writers, actresses, actors, and even gay
rights advocates, have signed a document for a total
ban on “wombs for rent,” refusing to consider surro-
gacy as an act of freedom or love, and asking the
European Union to ban this practice (www.cheliber-
ta.it 2015).
Also in Spain, the Platform “No somos vasijas”
(we are not vessels), the voice of a feminist group
linked to a European international network that
emerged in France against gestational surrogacy,
oppose commercial surrogacy and the reproductive
exploitation of women. A peculiar aspect of “No
somos vasijas” is that they oppose both commercial
and altruistic surrogacy (del Burgo 2015).
Similarly, in September 2016, fifty Italian les-
bians published a document against surrogacy (Bus-
cemi 2015) because it contributes to the
instrumentalization of women and trading of chil-
dren, as they consider that this practice “offers the
body of a woman to generate children on
commission,” which may also be subject to
“methods that are invasive and hazardous for her
health” and that “they sever the bond between the
surrogate and the newborn child” (Buscemi 2015).
Similarly, the Swedish Women’s lobby is also
against surrogacy because:
(a) the woman cannot be forced to waive her
human rights;
(b) the right to bodily integrity is above the right
to children;
(c) poor women can be exploited by rich
collectives;
(d) the surrogates can suffer the possible nega-
tive effects of the pregnancy; and
(e) it can reduce the female body to a container
(Sveriges Kvinn lobby n.d.).
On March 11, 2016, the nongovernmental associ-
ation No Maternity Traffic also presented a draft bill
to declare surrogacy illegal to the Presidency of the
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe,
which took place on March 15 and later to the Plen-
ary Assembly, held on April 18. The petition stated
that:
Surrogacy violates European and International
law, in particular the convention on the rights
of the child (1989), on the elimination of all
forms of discrimination against women (1979),
on the adoption of children (1967 and 1993), on
human trafficking (2005), and on human rights
and biomedicine (1997).
This is why we demand that: a) the Parliamentary
Assembly of the Council of Europe, in accor-
dance with Article 65 of its Rules of Procedure,
clearly condemn the practice of surrogacy itself,
as contrary to the rights and dignity of people;
b) the Governments initiate the drafting of a text
expressly prohibiting any form of surrogacy in
Europe, and c) the European Court of Human
Rights be the guarantor of women and children’s
rights and condemn the practice of surrogacy as
contrary to human rights. The defence of human
rights must adapt to new threats on humans. Eur-
ope must set an example for the universal aboli-
tion of the surrogacy. Women and children are
not objects!
Ethical problems related to the surrogate mother. First
of all, as regard the surrogate, commercial surrogacy
is not ethically acceptable because it objectifies her,
by using her body for an end other than her own
good, by treating her as a commodity, as something
that can be bought and sold, like a thing, which is
incompatible with the dignity of women and their
rights (Aznar and Tudela 2018).
Second, it is not ethical because of the social
injustice entailed in nonaltruistic surrogacy, given
that it can only be practiced by those who are finan-
cially well-off, that is, it would be exploitation of
economically weak women by economically strong
couples or individuals.
It is evident that many women in underdeveloped
countries have made surrogacy a way of life, since
the economic benefits that they obtain are much
higher than the wages in that country. A paradig-
matic case of the latter is that of four Mexican sisters,
resident in Tabasco. Milagros (aged thirty), Martha
(thirty), Maria (twenty-seven), and Paulina
(twenty-two) made surrogacy their way of life,
receiving around €13,000 per pregnancy (Baver-
stock 2016). In this case, the sisters, in addition to
carrying the child, agreed to breastfeed it for ten
days.
Third, the ethicality of surrogacy is indefensible
because it breaks what has come to be called the
“maternal–filial bond,” causing a traumatic physical
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or mental disorder between mother and child,
because the close bonds established between them
during the pregnancy are broken in surrogacy on
separating the child from its mother. These bonds are
biological and therefore unconnected to the inten-
tions for which that pregnancy is created, so they
also affect altruistic surrogacy (Lorenceau et al.
2015).
Furthermore, it has recently been reported that
the mother’s genome can affect the child’s genome
by modifying it (Vilella et al. 2015). This would add
another further reason for bonding between both. If,
additionally, it is known that the genomic modifica-
tions in the child can be transmitted to their off-
spring, the surrogate mother’s genome would
continue to be present, in some way, in the offspring
of the child she carries, which is ethically very diffi-
cult to accept.
Fourth, the ethical assessment of nonaltruistic
surrogacy presents objective difficulties because the
selection processes to which the potential surrogates
are subjected directly violate their dignity, as very
strict personal requisites are often required to guar-
antee the quality of the “product” that she may carry.
Underscoring the sense that the child is a product
are the guidelines of the American Society for
Reproductive Medicine and the Society for Assisted
Reproductive Technology (Practice Committee of
the American Society 2015) in which the topic is
thoroughly analyzed. While we cannot go into detail
here, the main areas addressed are:
(a) use of surrogacy;
(b) conditions that intended parents must meet;
(c) medical and social guidelines for selecting
gestational carriers; and
(d) the potential relationships that may exist
between the potential parents and gestational
carriers.
The third section specifies the conditions that sur-
rogate candidates must meet, which make reference
to five areas:
(a) analysis of their psychosocial condition by
an expert in these matters, which should
include a clinical interview and psychologi-
cal testing (where appropriate), carried out
in accordance with American Psychological
Association Ethical Standards;
(b) a complete evaluation of their health by a
qualified medical professional;
(c) testing to ensure that they do not have any
sexually transmitted diseases and that they
do not use drugs or have recent tattoos or
piercings and other adverse clinical circum-
stances; and
(d) undergo complete laboratory screening to
exclude HIV or other sexually transmitted
diseases.
As well as the aforementioned ethical problems
that affect the surrogate, other circumstances may
also arise, such as those that occurred in the case
of Miles, son of Kyle Casson. After fertilizing the
egg of an unknown donor with his sperm, the embryo
obtained was implanted in his mother (Odone 2015;
Sawer 2015), thus making Miles his grandmother’s
son and his father’s brother, which is ethically diffi-
cult to accept.
Can a child be demanded as a right or is a child a gift? A
child is always a gift given to parents; they do not
have a right to have one. Those who claim a sup-
posed right to have children, in our opinion, rarely
provide solid arguments to justify such a right, either
from natural law or from the civil code. If the right to
a child were granted, he or she would be denied the
consideration of absolute good in and of himself. He
would become a disposable object, something instru-
mentalizable, that is, he would be objectified, pre-
cisely the situation that those who argue against
the morality of surrogacy describe.
Not all that one wishes is a right. Desires for par-
enthood are limited by the dignity of persons and the
protection of their basic rights. Defending the right
of parents to have a child—with no ethical limita-
tions whatsoever—violates the rights of the child,
so it is not ethically acceptable.
The obligation to respect the intrinsic dignity of
the child, inseparably from his own nature, is unrest-
ricted; therefore, any action that instrumentalizes a
human being and makes him an object to satisfy the
desires of a third party is absolutely unjustified.
There is no right that allows the other to be ordered
like a commodity. Moreover, if it were an enforce-
able right to call another human being into existence,
there would also be the opposing right to be able to
take it away.
Whatever the reasons noted to defend the right of
parents to a child, no action justifies violation of the
fundamental right of children not to be treated as an
object. If children were the object of desire of par-
ents, their lives would have no more value than that
which the parents wished to give it, which is clearly
unacceptable.
Family law has generally responded to a child-
centered logic, based on the good of the child, but for
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half a century, child-centered logic has been dis-
placed by adult-centered logic: the freedom and
desires of the adult have become more important
than the needs of the child. In this sense, surrogacy
is the culmination of adult centrism, by sacrificing
the happiness of minors to the whims of adults
(Marco Abril 2017).
Can surrogacy be ethically compared to postnatal
adoption? An issue that has sometimes been debated
is whether the ethicality of surrogacy can be com-
pared to that of postnatal adoption. In our opinion,
a fundamental aspect that makes surrogacy different
to adoption is that, first, in surrogacy, the right of
some adults to have a child prevails, putting the con-
tracting parents’ right to a child first. In contrast, in
postnatal adoption, the rights of already born chil-
dren to be adopted, to try to find a family, prevail,
that is, the good of the child prevails. This means that
the situations are ethically very different, since the
purpose of postnatal adoption is to favor the good
of the child whose biological parents are unable to
take care of him, while the purpose of surrogacy is
to produce a child to satisfy the rights of some adults.
Is altruistic surrogacy ethical? It is striking that gener-
ally when assessing the ethicality of surrogacy, only
commercial surrogacy is considered, with little men-
tion is made of altruistic surrogacy.
In our opinion, although surrogacy can be dis-
guised as altruism, what is certain is that this practice
also objectifies the child because he or she may be
required to meet certain quality standards, which if
not met, may affect his fundamental rights or even
his life. The absence of contract does not preclude
the issues raised by disability or multiple pregnan-
cies; it simply complicates their legal resolution.
On March 10, 2016, the nongovernmental associ-
ation “No Maternity Traffic” presented an official
petition, signed by 107,957 European citizens, to the
President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the
Council of Europe, asking them to reject the legali-
zation of altruistic surrogacy, also known as non-
commercial surrogacy. Following intense debates,
the proposal was successful, with sixteen votes in
favor to fifteen against. Regardless of this, however,
it should not be overlooked that altruistic surrogacy
is a minority practice. As a result, it has sometimes
been proposed that it be legalized, thus paving the
way for commercial surrogacy, which, in our opin-
ion, corresponds more to a political maneuver than
an valid social reason. It still suffers from the same
ethical problems.
Epilogue
It can sometimes be argued that surrogacy, both
commercial and altruistic, is based on the exercise
of the reproductive and sexual rights of women and
more broadly on the right to exercise freedom of
both the contracting parents and the gestational sur-
rogate. However, the experience of countries that
have allowed surrogacy confirm that paying a
woman to carry a child only to renounce it after the
birth does not represent an advance in women’s
rights. Neither does it help to respect the rights of the
child, by treating it as a commodity that can be
objectified. Understanding these negative conse-
quences of surrogacy policies on the contracting par-
ties as well as the child, along with a firm grasp of
the ethical issues surrogacy raises, can facilitate
effective advocacy, even with secular groups,
against the legalization of surrogacy.
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Buffet, and N. Péry 2014. “GPA: Monsieur le président
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